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Abstract 
The late 2000s financial crisis within the euro area had distinct effects on different member states of the 
polity despite a shared monetary policy and supranational organizational structure. Certain countries 
like Greece suffered a prolonged (and ongoing) economic crisis while others, Portugal and Ireland as 
discussed in this thesis, had periods of crisis but returned to normalcy after some time. Commitment to 
certain policies at the national level cannot fully explain the speed of these recoveries; Portugal and 
Ireland, for instance, had different levels of commitment to and popular willingness to endure austerity 
measures. All three countries will be discussed considering their parliamentary structures (i.e. whether 
governments held a parliamentary majority, were maintained by an ideologically consistent coalition, 
etc.) to show that the power and decisiveness of ruling parties played some role in economic recovery. 
 
Introduction 
 The 2007-2008 financial crisis clearly outlined the interconnected nature of the global 
economy. While the crisis was set off by a much higher than expected default rate in the 
American subprime mortgage sector, the devaluation of assets related to the sector caused an 
outward cascade of panic among investors worldwide; soon, much of the globe was experiencing 
the same crisis. John L. Campbell and John A. Hall go as to say in their book The Paradox of 
Vulnerability that the collapse of the American financial firm Lehman Brothers on September 15, 
2008 was a direct cause of the following economic crisis in Ireland.1 Given the scope of the 
crisis, major national, supranational and international political institutions were driven to respond 
to the crisis in order to move the world’s economies toward stability and recovery; from this, 
there arises a general question of how economic policy adapted by different governing bodies 
influenced the recoveries (or lack thereof) of countries around the world following the financial 
crisis. 
 For countries in the so-called ‘periphery’ of the euro area, relatively smaller economies 
than those of ‘core’ member states like Germany and France, the conditions that led to crises of 
investor confidence and of unsustainable debt and deficit hold some similarities. After accession 
to the eurozone, countries like Greece, Portugal and Ireland were able to borrow at extremely 
 
1 John L. Campbell and John A. Hall, The Paradox of Vulnerability: States, Nationalism, and the Financial Crisis 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 91. 
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low interest rates from financial institutions in ‘core’ European Union countries due to the single 
currency, leading to nearly free lending conditions.2 However, when the 2007-8 crisis hit Europe, 
this led to a massive capital flight from the periphery back to institutions in the core; many 
countries found themselves in the midst of sudden debt crises. 
Chart 1. GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) 
 
Several factors complicate analysis of these economic crises. Certain euro area peripheral 
countries like Ireland and Portugal have, in one way or another, demonstrated a full economic 
recovery and growth and have shown increasing employment and investor confidence as 
measured through government bond yields in recent years. In terms of GDP per capita, Ireland 
and Portugal have both surpassed their 2007 and 2008 levels with relative ease; as of 2018, 
 
2 Campbell and Hall, 83-84. 
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Greece had only just nearly recovered to their pre-crisis level of GDP per capita (Chart 1).3 
Despite the three countries sharing the same currency and, thus, sharing the same monetary 
policy, the severity and lengths of their economic crises and the scale and speed of their 
economic recoveries were quite different. What accounts for these differences? 
The following thesis will argue that the structure of parliamentary power within 
peripheral euro area member states can account for the asymmetry of economic crises and 
recoveries related to the late 2000s global financial crisis. Using the case studies of Ireland, 
Portugal and Greece, it will be shown that governing parties or ideologically consistent/goal-
oriented coalitions with the majority of seats within the national parliamentary structure of any 
given country corresponded with a ability toward economic recovery; by ability, this author is 
referring to just that – a majority government, for instance, does not guarantee economic 
recovery but simply a variable which can enable recovery to occur. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the author has chosen to characterize the presence of decreased 10-year government bond 
yields and/or decreased unemployment to pre-crisis or near-pre-crisis levels as a signal of 
economic recovery. Low bond yields, a sign that foreign bond market investors view a country’s 
economy as stable and holding little risk, and low unemployment, a measure of the proportion of 
a national job market which is jobless and actively seeking work, do not in all instances co-exist 
and can imply different, even if often compatible, notions about the state of an economy. 
However, both indicate increased activity or at the very least great potential for increased activity 
within a national economy and thus are both appropriate in indicating economic recovery. 
Literature Review 
 
3 “GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) – Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Euro area,” World Bank, International 
Comparison database, last updated 2018. 
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=GR-IE-PT-XC>. 
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 There have been several pieces of literature analyzing asymmetric economic recoveries 
from shared crises; one of the most recent pieces of literature and perhaps the most relevant to 
this thesis is John L. Campbell and John A. Hall’s 2017 book The Paradox of Vulnerability. The 
authors argue that small states with strong national identities and ‘thick’ (strong) institutions 
guided by expert advice perceive themselves as vulnerable to outside attack and therefore react 
to crises decisively and effectively. Campbell and Hall focus on Denmark, Ireland and 
Switzerland as three examples of the model in action, with Denmark as their ‘ideal’ model and 
the Swiss/Irish as examples of how modifications to the model can be made. In their application 
of the model to Ireland, the only country they observe which utilizes the euro as its currency, , 
the authors argue that the 2008 crisis was brought on by huge amounts of public and private 
spending on real estate and construction in the 2000s mostly financed by other European 
countries; when Ireland acceded to the euro area in the early 2000s, it suddenly had access to 
capital at extremely low interest rates.4 According to Hall and Campbell, as Lehman Brothers 
and other global financial institutions collapsed and a liquidity crisis within Ireland’s banks was 
triggered, foreign capital flooded out of Ireland back toward the rest of Europe; a guarantee  
made by the Irish government to insure deposits for ailing banks additionally allowed for the 
accumulation of debt and the sustenance of a large deficit, adding an additional crisis to Ireland’s 
worries on top of the banking crisis.5 Hall and Campbell to some extent also suggest that a 
supposed hubris of Irish officials led to the crisis through ‘thin’ (rather than ‘thick’) institutions 
guided by politics rather than economic expertise.6 
 
4 Campbell and Hall, 83-84. 
5 Campbell and Hall, 91-93. 
6 Campbell and Hall, 103-106. 
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 If institutional thinness is what led Ireland into sustained crisis, what eventually led the 
economy toward recovery? Campbell and Hall note several factors: luck, insofar as the euro 
remained quite weak compared to the US dollar and UK pound sterling allowing for an increase 
in Irish net exports.7 Another suggestion they make is that “the presence of a cluster of high-
powered, flexible human capital” within Ireland, established during the Celtic Tiger era, led to an 
increased willingness from the international community to reinvest in Ireland.8 This latter point 
is rather important to Campbell and Hall’s argument; the Greek crisis serves as something of a 
counterexample to their argument for the Irish recovery. The authors suggest that while Greece 
had many of the same problems Ireland was facing in terms of massive capital outflow, the 
accumulation of debt and the sustenance of a large deficit and some measure of institutional 
thinness.9 However, the authors contend that “Greece was unlike Ireland in one very important 
respect – Greece did not develop hidden economic strength during the earlier period of growth,” 
-  in Ireland’s case the cluster of human capital - “that might have facilitated a fairly rapid 
recovery from the financial crisis.”10 
 
7 Campbell and Hall, 105. 
8 Campbell and Hall, 105-106. 
9 Campbell and Hall, 159. 
10 Campbell and Hall, 159-160. 
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 While it is true that the presence of human capital has been associated with strong 
national economic performance, a third country complicates Campbell and Hall’s distinction 
between Ireland and Greece: Portugal. Despite an observed lack of ‘hidden economic strength’ in 
the form of human capital in Portugal established prior to the crisis,11 the Portuguese economy 
appears to have staged a recovery in terms of decreased unemployment (Chart 2).12 This author 
would contend that while the Campbell and Hall model accurately explains some aspects of 
Ireland’s economic recovery (and Greece’s lack thereof) but misses some elements of this 
asymmetry. 
Proposed Model 
 Moral and political philosopher Brian Barry’s 1980 essay “Is it Better to be Powerful or 
Lucky?” may provide some guidance in considering the variables at stake within the discussion 
at hand. In his piece, Barry was attempting to offer an “alternative way of thinking about” 
political power and the chance that a political actor will accomplish or ‘succeed’ at some given 
 
11 See Stéphanie Guichard and Bénédicte Larre, “Enhancing Portugal’s Human Capital,” OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers no. 505 (2006). <https://doi.org/10.1787/871641300584>. 
12 See World Bank, “GDP per capita.” See “Portugal’s Economic Recovery: How Much Came from Ditching 
Austerity?,” Knowledge@Wharton, August 1, 2018, <https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/portugals-
economic-recovery-how-much-came-from-ditching-austerity/>; See “Unemployment by sex and age – monthly 
average,” Eurostat, last updated March 24, 2020, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-
/UNE_RT_M>. 
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task.13 Barry suggests that the probability of success can be determined by evaluating the 
probability of luck plus the probability of decisiveness.14 What exactly does this mean? Thought 
about in terms of a hypothetical committee of political actors, luck is defined as the “proportion 
of adventitious successes” that a committee member has if they do nothing whatsoever; this can 
also be understood as the probability that one’s surroundings in and of themselves will grant this 
actor with some advantage (e.g. everyone on the committee agrees on a number of issues).15 
Decisiveness, on the other hand, is the “proportion of adventitious successes” that a committee 
member has if they do act; this can be understood as the probability that an actor’s actions will 
increase their chances of success (e.g. lobbying or voting for a piece of legislation’s effects on its 
chances of passing).16  
This author would suggest that Barry is slightly selling short the depths of his ideas by 
boiling them down to the success = luck + decisiveness formula. Barry suggests that power must 
be distinguished from this notion of decisiveness. While decisiveness refers to a proportion of 
success given action, power is better understood, according to Barry, as a committee member’s 
“ability to overcome resistance.”17 While Barry does not apply this directly to the formula 
previously suggested, it does have some bearing on his logic. If a committee member’s ability to 
overcome resistance is zero (e.g. they are absent from the committee due to illness and have no 
means of voting remotely), regardless of their decisiveness they will be relying solely on luck. 
Simultaneously, one’s ability to overcome resistance can be understood as proportional to some 
capacity; if a committee member is able to overcome resistance 85 times but fails to overcome 
 
13 Brian Barry, “Is It Better to be Powerful or Lucky? Part 2,” Political Studies 28, no. 3 (1980): 338. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Barry, 348. 
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that same resistance 15 times, their potential to be decisive in the latter 15 cases is effectively 
zero and measured at their ‘proportion of adventitious successes’ in the event of action in the 
other 85 cases. How, then, does power interact with the success = luck + decisiveness formula? 
Barry’s definition of power can be understood to act as a multiplier in the original formula for 
decisiveness and the formula presented to represent his work can be better defined as such: 
success = luck + decisiveness*power. 
Why is this useful in examining the relationship between economic recovery and policy? 
Take the exact cases presented for this thesis as an example. In the context of the euro area at the 
national level, there are several shared aspects of luck: monetary policy for all countries is set by 
the same supranational body in the form of the European Central Bank; the European 
Commission and other supranational organizations in charge of economic policy coordination 
may have different protocol or agenda items in place at any given time that may be beneficial or 
non-beneficial to some member states; the domestic political considerations of powerful, ‘core’ 
European Union member states may also impact one’s chances of success; etc.. These can all be 
coded as ‘luck’ in that peripheral member states of the euro area have little-to-no ability to affect 
the circumstances of these variables. 
There are some things over which countries like Ireland, Portugal and Greece are 
decisive. Fiscal policy and banking policy are still largely made at the member state level in the 
European Union meaning that member states themselves can have some hand in staging an 
economic recovery. This is not to say that all policies have the same level of decisiveness; the 
level of decisiveness of any given policy would be considered the proportion of cases in which 
that policy leads to economic benefit (e.g. renewed bond market confidence, reduced 
unemployment, increased growth, etc.). 
9 
 
As for power, this author would suggest that the size and proportion of the governing 
party (or governing coalition)’s bloc, formal or informal on the basis of ideology, within the 
national parliamentary system is a key aspect of considering a government’s ability to overcome 
resistance. If your government holds under 50 percent of the seats in the parliamentary body and 
cannot convince a majority to implement policy, the government’s decisiveness effectively is 
diminished to zero given their inability to implement preferred policies; on the other hand, if the 
government has a strong majority within the parliamentary system, it is quite likely that policies 
leading to success (or not) can be implemented. Table 1 serves as a list of possible variables 
belonging to the three categories. 
Table 1. Luck, Power and Decisiveness at the National Level of the European Union 
Luck Decisiveness Power 
Monetary policy as 
determined by the ECB; 
leadership of the ECB’s 
preferred monetary policies 
Implementation of new 
fiscal/banking policies 
(austerity, stimulus, etc..) 
Size and proportion within 
parliament of governing 
party/coalition (majority 
government with extremely 
large party? Minority 
government? Coalition of two 
parties?, etc.) 
EU leadership broadly; 
coordination of beneficial (or 
detrimental) fiscal/banking 
policy from EU officials 
-- Ideological composition of 
parliament (mostly 
ideological allies?) 
International economic 
conditions: mood of bond 
markets/credit conditions; 
state of the economy in major 
economies like the US, UK, 
etc..;  
-- Significant advantage or  
leverage over talks with 
creditors, EU (rare) 
Domestic political 
considerations of powerful, 
‘core’ euro area economies 
(e.g. Germany, France) 
--  
 
 Given this frame of analysis from Barry, descriptions of historical background and of the 
mechanics of crisis in Greece, Portugal and Ireland can now begin. 
10 
 
Background on The Euro 
Economic History, and Structure 
 After the Second World War, European integration was driven by several distinct 
geopolitical forces and ideologies. According to Perry Anderson in The New Old World, some of 
these included the following: Jean Monnet, the French diplomat commonly considered one of the 
most influential figures in the founding of what would become the European Union, wanted to 
create a source of peace in Europe which would prevent the continent from breaking out into 
continent-wide wars that had been so devastating over the previous half century and thought 
economic and political integration might prevent such violence; the United States had an interest 
in European integration as it was increasingly concerned about the influence of the Soviet Union 
over Eastern Europe and wanted to create an Atlantic-centric alliance to contain the spread of 
that influence; France and West Germany, coming out of intense conflict with each other, had 
strategic and economic interests in balancing against one another.18 All of these factors played 
important roles in founding the basis of Europe’s common currency, the euro. 
 Europe’s integration was not just the product of geopolitical thought but also of economic 
thought and the basis of the monetary and fiscal policy executed by national and supranational 
governments in the European Union today can be found in the competing economic philosophies 
of France and West Germany. West Germany tended to prefer ordoliberalism as the basis of its 
monetary and fiscal policy; that is, a system in which rules are formulated in general terms and 
the state’s actions would ideally be limited to the enforcement of those rules while generally 
allowing unregulated free market activity.19 As West German (given reunification with the East 
toward the end of the century, eventually just German) economic philosophy developed over the 
 
18 Perry Anderson, The New Old World, (London: Verso, 2009), 21. 
19 Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James and Jean-Pierre Landau, The Euro and the Battle of Ideas, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2016), 61. 
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next several decades, other beliefs developed leading intellectuals toward  that lender of last 
resort activity, taken by central banks during times of economic crisis, could lead to a corruption 
of monetary policy and that crisis should be handled with a focus on structural reforms and 
austerity policies.20 French economic philosophy takes on a different stance toward rules; rules, 
according to the French philosophy, should be subject to the political process and possible 
renegotiation during times of crisis; additionally, unlike the German position, French 
intellectuals viewed austerity quite critically and monetary policy should be at least somewhat 
focused on increasing growth.21 In short, the German position centers around a ‘smart money’ 
approach to monetary policy prioritizing anti-inflation and balanced budget policy proposals, 
while the French position can be seen as a looser position more attuned to economic growth and 
crisis management. 
 Officially sanctioned motion toward a European monetary union started with a summit at 
the Hague in 1969 where heads of state in the predecessor to the European Union, the European 
Economic Community (EEC), called for the “full liberalization of capital movements, the total 
convertability of Member States’ currencies, and the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates.”22 By 
1972, the collapse of the Bretton Woods’ system with US President Nixon’s decision to take the 
dollar off the gold standard led to an immediate need to stabilize exchange rates within the EEC; 
the so-called ‘snake in the tunnel’ mechanism was developed to manage the floating of European 
currencies within “narrow margins of fluctuation against the dollar” was briefly successful but 
challenging to maintain due to global economic turbulence during the mid-1970s.23 The 
 
20 Brunnermeier et al., 66-67. 
21 Brunnermeier et al., 74. 
22 Quoted from European Parliament; “History of economic and monetary union,” Fact Sheets on the European 
Union, European Parliament, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/79/history-of-economic-and-
monetary-union>. 
23 Quoted from European Parliament. Ibid. 
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European Monetary System, created six years later to fulfill the same goal of exchange rate 
stability, weighted the currencies of all Member States aside from the United Kingdom against a 
constructed ‘European Currency Unit’ (ECU).24 Bilateral rates (i.e. exchange rates between any 
two Member States) was calculated based on rates against the ECU and fluctuations “had to be 
contained within a margin of 2.25 percent on either side of the bilateral rates” for most Member 
States.25 The EMU was much more successful than the ‘snake in the tunnel’ as a first pass at 
controlling European monetary policy in that it was able to stabilize exchange rate variability.26 
 From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, many developments took place which accelerated 
the pace of monetary integration. The Single European Act and Jacques Delors’ tenure as 
President of the European Commission provided the foreground to provisions in the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty formally established protocol for the introduction of a single currency for 
much of the European Union approximately ten years later.27 The euro, now used as official 
currency by 19 of the 27 Member States of the EU, allowed for complete coherence on issues of 
monetary policy and the setting of universal interest rates for borrowing across the Union; 
however, fiscal policy was largely still in the hands of Member States, causing some 
commentators to question whether the Union was ready for economic integration of this type.28  
Furthermore, the representation of German economic philosophy at the supranational 
level was quite clear through the adoption of the single currency.  The single official primary 
mandate given to the European Central Bank, the institution managing the euro, was to maintain 
price stability through low inflation.29 The ability of member states to use monetary policy to 
 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Anderson, 33. 
29 “Objective of monetary policy,” European Central Bank, 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/objective/html/index.en.html>. 
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counter trends like rising unemployment was now only available at the supranational level. 
Another clear instance of clear ordoliberal economic reasoning was evident in the adoption of 
Article 125 of the Maastricht Treaty – an effective ban on direct bailouts or rescue funds shared 
between individual Member States and a ban on the ECB directly buying government debt.30 
While other Member States saw this as a relatively unimportant rule with some flexibility, 
Germany saw this rule as quite important.31 The rule can be interpreted as yet more 
representation of German-style ordoliberalism in the economic structure of the European Union; 
without the ability to pursue expansionary monetary policy on one’s own or seek direct cash-
based help from other Member States or the ECB alone, expansionary fiscal policies might 
saddle the country with an unsustainable deficit and debt. Thus, the probability of taking on an 
austerity-based solution, amenable to the German economic philosophy, in this set of limited 
options is relatively high. 
Crisis Management 
 During the first several years of the euro as the main currency across much of the 
European Union, positive economic growth associated with lowered borrowing costs for many 
peripheral euro area countries and the increased flow of capital around the EU was a trend seen 
generally throughout the supranational polity; while some Member States experienced 
significantly faster rates of growth than others, the outlook was generally quite positive for most 
of the 2000s.32 However, economic contagion from the housing market crisis in the United States 
led to a sustained period of economic downturn within the euro area, particularly affecting states 
in the periphery such as Ireland, Greece and Portugal. Germany expected that measures such as 
 
30 Brunnermeier et al., 98. 
31 Ibid. 
32 David Sondermann et al., “Economic structures 20 years into the euro,” European Central Bank Occasional Paper 
Series no. 224 (June 2019): 10, <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op224~2349417aaa.en.pdf>.. 
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Article 125, the ban on direct bailouts granted to Member States by other countries in the euro 
area or by the European Central Bank, would be strictly enforced;33 this provoked something of 
an ideological battle among European heads of state about whether to adapt a French or German 
style of crisis response. As described in detail in the country-level sections of this paper on 
Ireland, Greece and Portugal, bailouts to countries dealing with unsustainable economic crises 
were eventually managed by the European Central Bank and European Commission with the 
assistance of the International Monetary Fund, collectively the ‘troika.’ While these bailouts 
sound in line with French economic philosophy, they were conditioned on the imposition of 
often harsh austerity policies aimed at restoring the confidence of international investors at the 
expense of growth and employment, a concession to more ordoliberal-minded thinkers. 
 One key moment in what Brunnermeier et al. call the ‘battle of ideas’ occurred at a 
summit between German and French leaders at Deauville in October 2010. The countries, led by 
Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy respectively, set forth an agreement that future troika 
bailouts would involve some level of private sector involvement – the taking on of some costs or 
losses by private creditors.34 According to Brunnermeier et al., this led to some uncertainty 
among investors who feared this agreement would increase the probability of default among 
countries undergoing crisis; borrowing costs skyrocketed for many of countries in rough 
economic states and pressure mounted to preemptively implement austerity policies in the 
economic-philosophical interest of Germany.35 According to the trio of authors, this was a 
decisive moment in the handling of the crisis that cemented control firmly with German 
interests.36 
 
33 Brunnermeier et al., 99. 
34 Brunnermeier et al., 29. 
35 Brunnermeier et al., 29-31 
36 Ibid. 
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 During the rest of the 2010s and the beginning of 2020, the European Central Bank itself 
took on measures related to monetary policy to ease liquidity conditions across the euro area. 
The European Central Bank has not raised interest rates since July 2011 and, in fact, with 
multiple instances of decisions to lower interest rates, has held a negative interest rate since June 
2014.37 In 2015, the European Union decided to pursue quantitative easing (QE), a monetary 
policy in which a central bank makes targeted purchases of government bonds and other 
financial assets in order to directly add money into the economy. QE performed by the European 
Central Bank between 2015 and 2018 will be discussed in greater detail in the country-specific 
sections presented in this paper. In September 2019, the ECB decided to resume QE programs; 
the current global COVID-19 pandemic, seen by many central banks around the world as a 
prelude to another economic crisis, prompted the European Central Bank to expand greatly 
ongoing asset purchasing through QE.38  
This understanding of the EU and ECB’s response to crisis is vital in assessing the luck 
aspect of this thesis’s Barry-influenced model. For a better look at power, one must turn to 
discussion of the member states themselves. In this thesis, Greece, Portugal and Ireland will be 
examined. 
Recent Political/Economic History and Crises at the National Level 
Greece 
 Perhaps the most infamous case to be examined for the purpose of this thesis, Greece 
may serve as an example of ineffective response to crisis at both the national and supranational 
levels. The late 2000s crisis battered Greece and recovery from the crisis has been remarkably 
 
37 “Key ECB interest rates,” European Central Bank, accessed April 2020. 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/key_ecb_interest_rates/html/index.en.html>. 
38 Martin Arnold, “ECB’s Draghi ignored in-house advice on decision to restart QE,” Financial Times, October 10, 
2019, <https://www.ft.com/content/de4a958a-eab3-11e9-a240-3b065ef5fc55>; Larry Elliott, “ECB U-turn shows it 
fears coronavirus could destroy eurozone project,” The Guardian, March 19, 2020, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/19/ecb-u-turn-shows-it-fears-coronavirus-could-destroy-eurozone-
project>. 
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slow for the country; Greek unemployment at the end of 2019 stood at nearly twice pre-crisis 
levels of unemployment and more than twice that of the euro area as a whole.39  
While Greece is the most complicated case of the three at hand for this thesis in that the 
country’s economic woes are in many senses significantly less resolved than those of Ireland and 
Portugal, its crisis provides a clear lens through which the background to the actions of the 
‘troika,’ the collaborative venture between the European Commission, European Central Bank 
and International Monetary Fund effectively to provide bailouts in exchange for austerity can be 
seen. In order to understand Greece’s economic downturn and, therefore, the nature of the 
economic crisis across Europe it may help to understand more broadly the modern history of 
Greek democracy. 
Before the Eurozone 
 
 On July 23, 1974, a military junta which had instituted authoritarian control over Greece 
for more than seven years collapsed following growing divisions within the government and 
military establishment over the Turkish invasion of North Cyprus.40 Former Conservative Prime 
Minister, Constantine Karamanlis, shortly thereafter took over as Prime Minister under the 
leadership of a new political party, New Democracy.41 Greece underwent several constitutional 
reforms over the following seven years under Karamanlis’s rule, culminating in the admission of 
Greece to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1981.42 
 Greece’s entry into the EEC was happening at a unique moment in European history; 
while European integration had been an active project for over three decades, US President 
 
39 See Eurostat, “Unemployment.” 
40 “Greece’s Debt: 1974-2018,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed February 18, 2020, 
<https://www.cfr.org/timeline/greeces-debt-crisis-timeline>. 
41 “BBC ON THIS DAY: July 23, 1974: Greek military rule gives in to democracy,” BBC News, accessed February 
18, 2020, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/23/newsid_2515000/2515819.stm>. 
42 Ibid. 
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Nixon’s abandonment of the Bretton Woods gold standard dollar peg in 1971 had disrupted the 
normal business in trade in an increasingly integrated Europe. The requirements and the 
economic experiences of those under the European Monetary System, previously described in 
the section describing the economic history of the euro, would greatly affect future entrants into 
closer economic integration like Greece.43 During the 1980s, meeting the conditions for 
remaining within the EMS was no easy task for Greece; Greek GDP steadily fell during the first 
half of the decade.44 
 After the Maastricht Treaty and the agreement of conditions for the establishment of the 
euro, Greece was just eking “out primary surpluses.”45 According to Tooze, however, debts were 
piling up as political control swayed between the previously mentioned center-right New 
Democracy party and the social-democratic PASOK party; “huge stocks of debt” were 
accumulated in this time as the parties aimed at bringing Greece to modernity.46 Between 1980 
and 1993, the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 20.8 percent to 91.2 percent.47 By 2000, on the 
eve of its eurozone membership, Greek public debt reached 104 percent of GDP, breaching the 
Stability and Growth Pact’s (SGP) upper limit of 60 percent on this figure.48  
 In short, the roots of later Greek fiscal woes were taking their place prior to and on the 
eve of eurozone accession. 
Euro Area Accession and Fiscal Relaxation: 2001-2009 
 
43 Adam Tooze, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World (New York: Viking, 2018), 92. 
44 “Gross Domestic Product,” Google Public Data, last updated July 6, 2018, < 
https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=n
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&ind=false>. 
45 Tooze, 101. 
46 Tooze, 107/323. 
47 Michel Husson, “The Greek public debt before the crisis,” published March 2015, 
<http://hussonet.free.fr/graudite.pdf>, 2. 
48 Tooze, 101. 
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 To meet Maastricht criteria for euro area membership meant some fiscal constraint on the 
part of the Greek government. As previously stated, the Greek government was able to maintain 
primary surpluses while foreign borrowing allowed for modernizing Greek infrastructure and 
institutions. This meant that while foreign borrowing took place, a fairly significant amount of 
tax revenue was being collected. In 2001, as borrowing costs and service charges fell with 
accession to the euro area, it could have been an opportunity to use tax revenues to pay off 
accumulated debt; instead, the Greek government decided to relax tax collection altogether.49 
Between 2000 and 2003, the Greek deficit also went beyond SGP limits of 3 percent of GDP and 
reached more than 5.3 percent of GDP given heavier-than-expected costs for the Athens 
Olympics in 2004.50 
 Overall, during the period leading from accession to the crisis, it is not the level of debt 
which stands out but the lack of tax revenue and deficit. Contrary to popular belief and 
expectation given lower borrowing costs, the rate of Greek public borrowing did not increase 
significantly after euro area accession. In fact, in 2006, the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio was 
marginally lower than it had been than in 2001.51 Greece accounted for less than 2 percent of 
cross-border funding in the euro area prior to the crisis.52 However, the level of debt-to-GDP was 
still quite high and this was being added onto an entirely deficient tax revenue program. Not only 
were Greek taxes low in theory, in practice they were not being paid at particularly high rates. 
Across this period, Greece had the highest percentage of self-employed workers of any European 
 
49 Ibid. 
50 “Greece’s Olympic bill doubles,” BBC News, November 12, 2004, 
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country – 35.1 percent -- and many ‘professionals’ in this sector “declared incomes that placed 
them consistently below the taxation threshold.”53 
 In 2007 and 2008, as the housing crisis in the United States started to spread across the 
Atlantic to European financial centers, it actually seemed as if Greece might have been immune 
from the worst effects of financial uncertainty; these hopes were, of course, dashed in light of 
questions about the level of debt and deficit. Greek exports and tourism slumped, certainly, but 
this was not unexpected or unusual.54 In fact, at the time of this slump, Greek banks attracted 
considerable deposit flows, peaking just months before the onset of the Greek crisis, given their 
lack of direct exposure to the American housing market security crisis.55 There were also, 
however, several questions about the level of Greek government debt and deficit; sovereign bond 
yields between Greece and Germany (i.e., the “premium investors demand to buy Greek 
government debt rather than German benchmarks”) skyrocketed from 2008 to 2009.56 The debt, 
as previously described, was indeed staggering and the deficit, according to communications 
between Athens and the Eurogroup, appeared to be heading toward above 10 percent of GDP in 
July of 2009.57 
The Onset of the Crisis and Austerity/Papandreou and Trichet: October 2009 – November 2011 
 On October 4, 2009, George Papandreou’s PASOK won the most seats in the Greek 
legislative elections, allowing for a PASOK majority government under his leadership.58 
Papandreou was immediately faced with a looming public debt and deficit crisis which had 
remained unaddressed by his New Democracy predecessor, Kostas Karamanlis. Two weeks after 
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54 Tooze, 323. 
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the election, Papandreou’s government alerted Eurostat that the Greek deficit would exceed 12.7 
percent of GDP and subsequent budget revisions increased the Greek debt burden from 99 
percent to 115 percent of GDP.59 The size of the deficit was shock to many given previously 
reported data from Greece; a European Commission report released in January would find that 
Greece’s financial figures were “so unreliable” and falsified that the deficit and debt might be 
even higher.60 Indeed, Eurostat would later update its 2009 estimates of the Greek deficit and 
debt to 15.4 percent of GDP and 126.8 percent of GDP respectively.61 By the end of 2009, €293 
billion in Greek public debt was outstanding with €206 billion being foreign-owned debt and €90 
billion being owned specifically by European banks.62 
 In early 2010, the EU’s leading institutions and de facto leading countries (France and 
Germany) were already taking sides in what was shaping up to be a deeply ideological battle 
over the fate of Greek debt. Looming over the EU was a May 19th deadline when Athens was due 
to make payments of €8.9 billion to creditors.63 French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the 
European Commission were in favor of mobilizing funds to bail out the Greek state and were 
opposed broadly to debt restructuring.64 This position can perhaps be explained by the state of 
French banks at the time; already in a fragile position, two of France’s most significant banks, 
BNP Paribas and Dexia, were holding significant amounts of Greek debt.65 For the French 
economy (or at least for the sake of French banks), haircuts (losses investors might incur if debt 
were restructured) might have been very detrimental. 
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 On February 11, 2010, however, Germany announced that they would support any 
emergency funds taken to support the euro but veto any specific offer of help to Greece.66 This 
was twofold; first, Germany was legally opposed to bailout out the Greek’s directly as Article 
125 of the Maastricht Treaty seems to rule out any such direct financial funding of ailing EU 
member-states by other EU member-states; second, developing German public opinion was in 
opposition to mutual responsibility for debt.67 This opinion developed consistently in Germany; a 
January 2012 Eurobarometer questionnaire on debt pooling found that 71 percent of Germans 
believed that such proposals would benefit only those in the worst difficulties, 74 percent 
believed that it would penalize those not in difficulty and only 35 percent believed it would 
reduce the cost of crisis; these answers were fairly significantly higher, higher and lower 
respectively than the average across the EU.68 
 This is not to suggest that official statements by German officials were uniform in this 
strictly anti-bailout sentiment. German Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble proposed in 
Spring of 2010 a European Monetary Fund for the explicit task of bailing out member-states like 
Greece; Angela Merkel publicly denied the viability of the scheme, calling instead for IMF 
involvement in the Greek crisis.69 While Merkel’s plea for IMF involvement eventually won out, 
some, Schäuble included, felt that IMF involvement would be deeply embarrassing for Europe.70 
Eventually, despite pan-European concerns about the optics of IMF involvement, the European 
Troika, composed of the IMF, European Commission and ECB was initiated on March 25, 2010; 
after this point, it is made clear that the path forward would be support conditioned on 
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implementing massive structural reform within Greece in the form of austerity and support 
granted only in cases when Greece was at risk of completely losing access to international 
markets.71 
 It did not take particularly long for such an event to occur. On April 22, 2010, given the 
dire state of the debt and deficit in Greece, Fitch Ratings downgraded Greece’s creditworthiness, 
effectively shutting it out of the international bond market.72 Five days later, the Greek 
government formally requested Troika assistance.73 Meanwhile, the situation across Europe 
particularly within banks exposed to Greek debt was decaying rapidly; Tooze described 
interbank lending as essentially at a complete standstill during this period.74 
 By early May, a deal for support from the Troika was reached with approval by both the 
Greek and, given their significant amount of sway over the proceedings, German parliaments. 
Greece, as part of the ‘Memorandum of Economic and Fiscal Policies’ package agreed to deliver 
a turnaround in its budget balance of 18 percent of GDP and reduce its deficit by 7.5 percent 
GDP in 2010 in exchange for €110 billion from the Troika.75 76 The ECB also launched the so-
called Securities Market Programme, an initiative to buy and sell government bonds in order to 
ease market conditions.77  
The reception to these measures in Greece was initially mixed; over 50 percent of 
respondents in a poll of Greek citizens said they would prefer these programs over a default but 
the same programs resulted in a general strike from Greek workers during and following Troika 
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deliberations.78 79 Eventually, the position of Greek workers in opposition to austerity gained the 
upper hand in the balance of Greek public opinion; the years to come would be characterized by 
mass public demonstrations against Troika involvement in the Greek economy and austerity 
more generally. 
By early 2011, despite the toughness of these austerity measures and the size of aid 
packages, the conditions in Greece did not appear to be getting very much better. The ECB at 
one point owned 15 percent of Greek public debt and, with rising inflation threatening the 
German economy, Jean-Claude Trichet decided that something needed to change.80 The ECB, in 
the midst of the crisis, raised interest rates, severely restricting credit conditions within the euro 
area.81 Over the next few weeks, the Greek sovereign bond yield spread as opposed to the rest of 
the eurozone reached 1200 points, showing how risky international investors felt Greek bonds 
were at the time (and, therefore, how unconfident they were in the ability of Greece to solve its 
debt crisis).82 
In June, the US and Germany called for more debt restructuring which would be pushed 
through in yet another austerity package in the Hellenic Parliament later in the month; an IMF 
assessment published in July detailing the likely effects of the package concluded that it would 
not be nearly enough to address the scale of the crisis in Greece.83 Later that month, France and 
Germany agreed to yet another provision of funds and an expansion of the EFSF bond market 
stabilization funds.84 In October, yet another plan was drafted involving debt restructuring seeing 
banks take haircuts of tens of billions of euros, more than 100 percent of Greek GDP in troika 
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funds and, once more, more austerity.85 With Greek unemployment at 19.7 percent, up from 8 
percent before the onset of the crisis, Papandreou decided that enough had been enough and he 
would call a public referendum on whether to continue the Troika programs.86 At a G20 meeting 
in early November, however, it was made clear to Papandreou with pressure from Merkel and 
Sarkozy that the only referendum they would accept the results of without repercussion was 
whether Greece would remain in the euro area.87 This lack of agency amidst the already high-
pitched political discontent in Greece led to his fairly swift replacement by Lucas Papademos, a 
former vice president from the ECB, under a new national unity party.88 Coincidentally, Mario 
Draghi took over as President of the ECB about a week before this political shift in Greece, 
ending Jean-Claude Trichet’s tenure and leading to questions about what was in store for Greece 
and the Troika. 
Papademos/Samaris, Draghi and Stagnation: 2012-January 2015 
 Despite Papademos’s leadership under a ‘unity’ party, Greece was anything but unified. 
Perhaps signifying helplessness among the Greek public and weariness over austerity being tried 
over and over again to little change for the better, several significant movements had begun to 
arise in opposition to the two major parties, PASOK and New Democracy. On the left was 
Syriza, a “radical alternative to PASOK” under the leadership of Alexis Tsipras; and on the right 
was Golden Dawn, a neofascist movement which, in Crashed, Tooze likened to the original Nazi 
movement in Germany, writing that both involved “a comprehensive social and economic crisis 
[providing] the setting for a program of a national racial community.”89 
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Both of these radical parties made major gains in the May 2012 Greek legislative election 
while both New Democracy and PASOK lost ground from the previous election in terms of vote 
count. After approximately one week of attempts to form a government with no success, another 
election was scheduled for June 17 in which the leftist Syriza party performed even more 
convincingly. Ultimately, the New Democracy party was able to form a government under 
Antonis Samaras under a coalition with PASOK and DIMAR, a small social-democratic party.90  
Kalyvas noted that this political lack of clarity and extended election period “had 
significant repercussions” on the debt crisis, leading to a continued lack of progress in bringing 
Greece toward recovery.91 Overall, as debt structuring continued across 2012 (with private 
creditors conceding €107 billion), the actual reduction of debt was less than hoped for (19 
percent).92 Even worse, planners at the supranational level had significant lapses in judgment 
over certain policies; one policy aimed at making Greek exports more competitive, wage 
reductions for the average Greek laborer, ended up moving the current account into surplus but 
only by contracting Greek imports; Greek exports remained stagnant, drawing a distinction 
between its experience and simultaneous experiences in countries like Ireland.93 
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Across 2013 and 2014, conditions further worsened. In July of 2013, the Greek 
parliament okayed another round of austerity measures as calls for a general strike increased 
across Greece.94 By 
2014, Greek 
unemployment had 
reached 27 percent 
with the majority of 
young people out of 
work (Chart 3).95 
Understandably, 
these conditions led to significant unrest and discontent with the Samaras premiership.  
Quantitative Easing (QE), Syriza and a (Brief) Glimmer of Change 
 On January 22, 2015, Mario Draghi announced that the ECB would start a quantitative 
easing (QE) program of 60 billion euros a month, aiming to purchase government and corporate 
bonds  to stabilize the markets and increase the supply of money to investors; the hope was that 
such a program would stimulate the economy in ways similar to those experienced in the United 
States as it embarked on a similar program several years earlier.96 While the ECB had gone on 
bond-buying excursions before, none was quite as targeted as what QE was after. 
 That same week, Greek elections resulted in a change of government. Samaras was 
ousted in favor of a coalition between Syriza and ANEL, a nationalist conservative party with a 
eurosceptic world view. With Alexis Tsipras as the Prime Minister and Yanis Varoufakis, a new 
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Finance Minister, there was some sense that the status quo might change with respect to 
austerity. Varoufakis, for instance, believed that Draghi’s turn to QE, if accepted unilaterally by 
Athens, would box Greece into accepting even more austerity and believed that if the new 
government were to have any grasp over debt negotiations, it would have to play a game in 
which it threatened possible financial contagion.97 Varoufakis’s game plan? To threaten to 
default on bonds present on the ECB’s balance sheet, making quantitative easing a huge red flag 
to conservative thinkers across the eurozone.98 This hardball plan did not result, however, in the 
expected result. By June, Varoufakis had been able to delay an offer of more austerity but was 
given an ultimatum on another bailout plan with more of the same.99 Syriza, elected to oppose 
such austerity, was put in the position to reject the offer and face potential expulsion from the 
eurozone (and perhaps, if legally mandated, the European Union); Tsipras called a popular 
referendum on the matter. 61 percent of Greek voters rejected the troika’s austerity proposal in a 
referendum on July 5; Tsipras, however, decided at the last minute to not abide by the results of 
the referendum and upon Varoufakis’s resignation accepted a plan with modest debt write-offs 
but continued austerity, scheduled to conclude in August of 2018.100 
 Ultimately, the state of things remained unstable in Greece over the next several years. In 
February 2017, the IMF warned that the Greek debt it had fought so hard to restructure in 2015 
as part of the troika remained unsustainable and on “an explosive” path.101 10-year bond yields, a 
proxy for the Greek government’s borrowing costs from private creditors, had only just reached 
near pre-crisis levels, signaling something akin to economic recovery but without much 
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resonance among the Greek public or within the international bond markets.102 While Greece 
was able to stage its first bond sale in three years later that year, half of those who bought bonds 
were already holders of existing Greek debt, suggesting ambivalence on behalf of investors 
unaffected thus far to invest in Greece.103 In 2018, the Greek government approved of extremely 
unpopular property reforms which allowed for the electronic auctioning off of foreclosed-upon 
properties; by April 12, 2018, an estimated 10 percent of the population had been affected by 
such auctions.104 
The End of Austerity and What Remains/Conclusion 
 In August 2018, Greece’s long inclusion in the troika’s austerity-bailout program finally 
came to an end with European officials telling journalists that Greece could finally “turn the 
page” on the crisis.105 With unemployment in the country still at nearly twice what it was prior to 
the crisis, it was no surprise that Syriza’s years of leadership, less effective than many in the 
country had hoped for, had come to an end and New Democracy would lead the country forward 
with a decisive majority in the Hellenic Parliament.106 After years of failed government action 
against austerity and a misplaced submission to austerity, Greece’s attempts toward economic 
recovery more or less looked ineffectual. 
Portugal 
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Much like in the Greek case, modern Portuguese democracy came at the ousting of 
dictatorship. On April 25, 1974, modern Portuguese democracy began with the ousting of the so-
called Estado Novo regime. While it appeared at first to some in the West that Portugal’s new 
leadership would align with the Soviet Union because of the apparent strength of Portuguese 
Communists, the Socialist Party (PS) was brough to power by the electorate a year after the 
ousting of the dictatorship. The Socialist Party was a social-democratic party, a member of the 
Second International, along with the German SPD and the British Labour Party and was 
committed to what Daniel Finn calls “Atlantic normalcy.”107 This transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy provided the background for Portugal’s accession into the 
European Economic Community and its eventual membership in the European Union’s monetary 
union. 
Eurozone Accession/Before the Crisis 
 Portugal’s entry into the euro area in 1999 was relatively shaky compared to other 
member state experiences. At this juncture, traditionally strong Portuguese sectors were finding 
themselves increasingly unable to compete with new entrants to the global market like China and 
India. The end of the Multi Fiber Agreement in the mid-1990s led to a significant shift in the 
prioritization of sectors in the Portuguese economy; whereas textiles represented 33 percent of 
total Portuguese exports before the end of the Agreement, they only represented 13 percent of 
total exports by 2006.108  
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 Portugal had a somewhat underwhelming first decade as a euro area member-state at least 
compared to the spectacular performances of some smaller, Mediterranean euro area economies. 
While the Portuguese economy grew at a substantial rate overall, it was being outpaced 
substantially by other EU member-states. Portuguese GDP, as a percentage of the average EU 
GDP, fell from 75 percent in 2001 to 66% in 2008.109 By 2006, the average Portuguese worker 
was earning 60 percent of the wage given to their Spanish counterparts.110 While Portuguese net 
growth was undeniable, it was also not consistent. During 2003, a year of growth for Greece and 
Ireland of 5.9 percent and 4.4 percent respectively, Portugal registered negative growth of -0.9 
percent, making it the only euro area country other than Germany to enter a recession during that 
year.111 
 This is not to say that Portugal’s entry into the euro area did not come with the benefits 
shared by other so-called ‘peripheral’ countries. Portugal experienced an influx of foreign capital 
as a result of its monetary integration with Europe similar to Ireland.112 One distinction was that 
investment was primarily occurring in non-tradable sectors rather than in, say, the real-estate 
sector as was the case in Ireland.113 This allowed for substantial structural reforms in Portugal all 
while government expenditure was consolidated. Total government expenditure decreased from 
45.8 percent of GDP in 2005 to 43.6 percent of GDP in 2008, allowing for a deficit that stood at 
only 2.7 percent of GDP.114 Meanwhile, substantial investment was occurring in education, 
research and development and production focus and initiative was being shifted toward 
renewable energy sources.115 While Portugal’s current account deficit remained high by the end 
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of the decade, the country’s export growth from 2006 to 2010 exceeded that of other peripheral 
countries.116 
The Crisis 
 The end of the 2000s started, like Greece, far less dramatically than the following years 
might have suggested. While it was clear that the American subprime crisis was cascading into 
European markets, it appeared for some time that some of the more dramatic ripples of economic 
contagion would at least partially skip over Portugal. During the second half of 2009, 10-year 
Portuguese government bond yields decreased and the difference to German bonds was less than 
100 basis points, a signal that investors saw the Portuguese economy as relatively stable.117  In 
November 2009, 10-year yields were at their lowest monthly showing since March 2006.118 
 This is not to say that the picture was wholly positive in Portugal; by the end of 2009, it 
was also clear that the Portuguese economy was in the midst of an economic recession with 
official figures projecting that the economy would contract by more than 3 percent during that 
year.119 Worsening economic conditions, even if not quite as dramatic as the hardest-hit 
European economies up to that point, explain the diminished performance in the 2009 legislative 
election of the incumbent Socialist Party; whereas the party had received 45.03 percent of the 
vote in the 2005 election, that plurality fell to 36.56 percent of the vote in 2009.120 121 José 
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Sócrates, the party’s leader, formed a minority government at the end of 2009, making him the 
leader of the country as Portugal’s economic woes accelerated dramatically.122  
The economic recession Portugal had entered into in 2009 was clearly the most pressing 
issue that the incoming government under Sócrates would have to face but it was also clear that 
Portugal’s deficit and public debt were reaching unsustainable levels. Portuguese public debt 
reached 87.8 percent of GDP in 2009 and the deficit had reached 9.4 percent of GDP. The scale 
of the deficit had been expected to be much lower in earlier estimates, adding to pressing 
concerns over the sustainability of economic conditions within Portugal.123 124 Sócrates’ 
government, in response to brewing investor concerns and warnings from credit agencies about 
deteriorating sovereign debt conditions, revealed a budget proposal which would have reduced 
the deficit by 1 percent of GDP over the following year and to below 3 percent of GDP by 
2013.125 However, growing investor fears during the first few months of 2010 over the 
unsustainability of debt in Greece had a contagious effect, fueling rising bond yields in 
Portugal.126 Additionally, the budget proposal faced significant opposition within Portugal from 
workers who objected to wage freezes and benefit cuts. To make matters worse, the National 
Statistics Institute (INE) in March revised growth estimates for 2009 downward leading some to 
question whether the austerity proposed would be enough.127 128 All in all, it seemed as if the 
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government’s initial proposals would be neither accepted by workers nor effective in dealing 
with a worsening economic crisis.  
Despite these initial negative signs, these measures were eventually rushed through the 
Portuguese parliament in late April 2010 in attempt to calm extremely anxious debt markets after 
the downgrade of Greek and Portuguese debt by Standard & Poor’s.129 Despite initial market 
shakiness and fears that austerity would limit growth potential, the adoption of strong austerity 
measures by Portugal and Ireland seemed to convince investors by July that the government had 
some handle on the crisis; as a result, interest rates in Portugal and the similarly austerity-bound 
Ireland started to fall.130 131  
However, this newfound confidence was easily shaken by developments elsewhere in the 
euro area, a trend visible throughout the Portuguese crisis. Lourtie attributes a spike in 
Portuguese 10-year bond yields in late September to international contagion related to the 
decision in Ireland to bail out Anglo Irish Bank.132 Additionally, mixed messaging from the 
European Council about whether the EU’s leaders would accept losses for banks and private 
investors as part of future crisis management mechanisms “was like adding fuel to the flames” 
and drove even more volatility in borrowing costs for Portugal.133 The approval in November 
2010 of one of the most austere budgets in modern Portuguese history did seem to drive the 
country’s borrowing costs down temporarily but deep uncertainty over developments in other 
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parts of the euro area and at the supranational level made sure that bond market volatility 
remained a fact of life.134 135 
Austerity measures, unpopular among Portuguese workers and ineffective at calming 
investors had reached a breaking point for some in the Portuguese Assembly. An austerity 
measure which would have further consolidated expenditure, increased taxes and cut salaries in 
the public sector was rejected by the Assembly in March 2011. This event ledto major political 
and economic ramifications within Portugal.136 Ten-year bond yields rose nearly 140 points 
between March and April; the National Statistics Institute revised the budget deficit and debt 
upward in response to increasing borrowing costs and the rapidly diminishing investor taste for 
Portuguese bonds (Chart 4).137 José Sócrates resigned as Prime Minister triggering an early 
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election set for June; and, perhaps most crucially for Portugal’s immediate future, the Portuguese 
government formally requested financial assistance from the so-called Troika. 138 
The deal eventually reached with the Troika was for a €78bn bailout given out over the 
following three years; in exchange, the Portuguese government agreed to reduce its budget 
deficit dramatically from 9.1 percent of GDP to 5.9 percent of GDP within 2011 alone and to 3 
percent by 2013.139 While José Sócrates had resigned as Prime Minister, he was still serving as 
his party’s leader and the caretaker prime minister at this time; perhaps aware of this fact and of 
the upcoming election, he made clear in a television address to the nation following the 
announcement of the bailout that there would be no “cuts in public sector wages or the minimum 
national wage, nor any public sector dismissals” as part of the deal.”140 
These words meant to calm fears of potentially overreaching austerity did not deliver 
results beneficial to Sócrates in the June legislative election. The Standard Eurobarometer 75 
survey, conducted a month before the election, revealed that 73% of Portuguese respondents felt 
that the government’s response to the economic crisis up to that point had not been effective.141 
Given that Pedro Passos Coelho, the leader of the main opposition party, had already written 
approvingly of the bailout deal reached by the Socialist government and, thus, there was little 
chance that the bailout program would be prevented,142 Portuguese voters may have treated the 
election as a referendum on the performance of the current government. This explanation would 
account for PS roundly losing its previous electoral plurality to Passos Coelho’s center-right 
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Social Democratic Party (PSD). The PSD won 38.66 percent of the vote to PS’s 28.05 percent of 
the vote.143 Passos Coelho immediately announced plans to form a coalition with the People’s 
Party (CDS-PP), a smaller conservative party. Together, these parties controlled 132 of the 230 
seats in the Portuguese Assembly bringing the government coalition to a comfortable majority.144 
145 Upon winning the election, Passos Coelho said in an address to the Portuguese people that 
austerity would result in two “terrible years” but that the country would be able to restore growth 
and investor confidence.146 
Passos Coelho’s administration of the crisis and institution of austerity did not seem to 
quell investor concerns over the sustainability of the Portuguese debt and deficit for the rest of 
2011 even though the Troika’s deficit and debt targets were consistently being met. The 10-year 
bond yield rose more than 220 basis points from June to December.147 148 149 Intriguingly, the 
rationale which may explain some of this reticence toward Portugal may have nothing to do with 
the government’s ability to meet bailout conditions. In July 2011, the American credit rating 
agency Moody’s downgraded Portugal from Baa1 to Ba2 in part over fears related to Greek debt 
restructuring. The agency wrote in its ‘ratings rationale’ that, in the event of debt restructuring 
for Greece, some policymakers would make private sector participation and the imposition of 
losses on private investors a precondition of further lending.150 Moody’s suggested that any 
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moves toward debt restructuring and private sector participation for Greece could imply “a rising 
risk” that these would be preconditions “for additional rounds of official lending to Portugal in 
the future as well.”151 In essence, part of Portugal’s lack of appeal to the bond market had more 
to do with Greece and its dealings with the Troika than anything happening within the political 
economy of Portugal. 
Some developments within Portugal were of potential concern to analysts. In October 
2011, it was reported that €1.1bn of debt had gone unreported by the regional government of 
Madeira, leading Antonio Garcia Pascual, an economist specializing in southern Europe for 
Barclays Capital, to remark that the government had “not yet secured effective control over 
regional debts.”152 The government responded to this revelation and others like it with more 
austerity and fiscal consolidation.153 
Despite increasingly severe austerity measures putting some downward pressure on the 
debt and deficit, investors may have been concerned about the adverse effects of the same 
measures on growth and employment. Portugal was then facing one of the most severe 
recessions in Europe; according to EU forecasts made in November 2011, the Portuguese 
economy would contract by 3 percent in 2012, a higher forecast of contraction than any other EU 
member-state including Greece.154 In the same month, Portuguese unemployment surpassed 14 
percent.155 While the coalition majority’s support for these measures was clear, the public was 
increasingly frustrated with the disruptive nature of the recession. Among the labor movement, 
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dissatisfaction with the status quo of austerity grew. A general strike held during the last week of 
November 2011 protesting the increasingly harsh austerity measures was one of the largest 
demonstrations the country had seen in over 30 years. On the same day as the general strike, the 
ratings agency Fitch cut the rating on Portuguese sovereign debt to so-called junk status and 
cited both fiscal imbalances and the country’s deep recession.156 
At least for investor confidence, 2012 was something of a year of recovery for Portugal. 
Borrowing costs as expressed by the 10-year government bond yield reached their crisis high, 
13.85%, in January of 2012 but would go on to fall by over 650 base points during 2012.157 This 
downward bond yield trend was accompanied by optimism from the Troika over the 
sustainability of economic conditions within Portugal; Peter Weiss, an economist working for the 
European Commission, said in April of 2012 that he did not “believe the government can do 
more” to meet its bailout requirements.158 
Increasing investor confidence, however, was not accompanied by any remarkable or 
tangible reward for most Portuguese citizens. At least in 2012, the reward for the renewed 
investor optimism brought on by austerity was more austerity. While acceptance of the 
conditions of troika bailout had been a near-universal among Portugal’s political parties during 
the previous year, the Socialist Party became more wary of continued austerity. Carlos Zorrinho, 
a Socialist Party official, responded to a government proposal in September 2012 to raise the 
proportion of employee wages withheld as social security contributions and lower corporate 
entities’ social security burden by saying that Passos Coelho was “obsessed with austerity.”159 
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Alongside opposition parties, those against austerity in the general public started to voice their 
opinions more forcefully. Following the social security proposal, hundreds of thousands of 
demonstrators across Portugal staged the largest anti-austerity protest yet seen during the 
crisis.160 Two months later, as demonstrators protested against another austerity proposal to raise 
income taxes to around 30 percent, protesters seemed more energetic than before; riot police 
charged crowds after stones and bottles were thrown in anger over the proposed measures.161 
Despite the intense public pressure to back away from austerity measures, the Portuguese 
Assembly decided to back the 2013 budget including some of these proposals.162 
Unemployment in Portugal reached its crisis reached its peak of 17.4% in January 2013, a 
full year after bond yields had begun to slide back toward their pre-crisis levels.163 In fact, two 
years after Passos Coelho suggested that Portugal would be able to return to growth and investor 
confidence in that time, it seemed like only the latter had come true. GDP growth as an annual 
percentage had just begun to trend back upward; the Portuguese economy during 2013 was still 
clearly in recession and had contracted 0.92 percent over the year.164 While unemployment 
would drop to 15.1% by December from its peak in January, this was still nearly 3% above 
where unemployment stood when Passos Coelho entered office and well above where 
unemployment stood at its lowest point in 2008 at 8.5%.165 
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Amid these mixed signals, the Portuguese government announced that it was planning to 
cut spending by €6bn over the next four years, extending austerity well beyond the expiration 
date of the Troika’s bailout scheduled to end in 2014.166  However, plans to implement this 
austerity program were shaken by the surprise resignation in July 2013 of Vitor Gaspar, 
Portugal’s finance minister; Gaspar’s resignation letter cited the loss of “public support” in 
continuing austerity as part of his reasoning.167 Up to this point, the government was consistent 
in pushing for austerity on its own accord; however, Gaspar’s resignation may have shifted the 
government’s priorities. During a series of September talks with the Troika, Passos Coelho’s 
government argued that it should be allowed to relax austerity measures as it prepared to exit the 
bailout program. While European officials largely rebuffed these arguments, they still showed a 
shifting calculus for a previously austerity-happy government.168 
Eventually, however, European pressure and the promise of a clean bailout exit drove 
Lisbon to recommit to austerity in its proposed budget for 2014 including further cuts to public 
sector pay and pensions.169 At least some of these measures were overruled by the Portuguese 
constitutional court, putting pressure on the government to find alternative ways to reduce 
spending by the €388m needed to ensure that bailout conditions were met.170 To make matters 
more precarious for Passos Coelho, the opposition Socialist Party’s leader refused to coalesce to 
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an agreement to cut spending and suggested that such measures would be part of “the 
government’s strategy for impoverishing the country.”171 
By April 2014, it had become clear that the opposition and the public’s limited appetite 
for austerity had been exhausted. Portugal announced that it would be exiting the bailout 
program in May with no backstop and no significant chance that the country would request a 
second bailout from the Troika.172 While talks of austerity and possible future Troika dealings 
had proceeded without much thought before this point, the government now had to proceed with 
utmost caution; 2015 was an election year and committing to austerity in light of the deep 
distaste among the Portuguese population for more austerity would be a death sentence. Opinion 
polling from earlier in the year suggested that the Socialist Party’s shift toward anti-austerity and 
away from former Prime Minister Sócrates’ general commitment to meeting Troika conditions 
had benefitted the opposition party; the Socialists commanded a nearly 8 percent lead over the 
Social Democrats under Passos Coelho.173 Meanwhile, Portuguese unemployment in April 2014 
had edged downward to 14.5% and the 10-year bond yield, a remarkable 3.82 percent given the 
state of the same figure a year or two years prior, had officially dropped to just one basis point 
over its lowest recorded point in 2009.174 175 The revitalization of Portugal’s investor image to 
pre-crisis levels had achieved a significant milestone with work still to be done on revitalizing 
non-financial sectors of the Portuguese economy. 
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By the second half of 2015, it was clear that the previously austerity-hungry government 
was interested in taking a different path during an election year. While sticking to the narrative 
that austerity was momentarily necessary to restore the economy, the PSD was running an 
election year campaign focused on easing austerity and phasing out tax changes made during the 
bailout period.176 The government additionally rejected calls from some institutions like the IMF 
to continue meeting budget deficit and debt targets by instituting further austerity measures, 
pointing to increased growth and employment.177 Indeed, things were improving. During 2015, 
Portugal experienced its highest rate of growth since before the crisis had begun and 
unemployment by the date of the October election had decreased to 12.5 percent.178 179 Now that 
the pressure of austerity was off, the Portuguese economy seemed to be entering a period of 
renewed growth. 
A year of decreased economic turmoil, however, was not enough to save PSD at the polls 
in October. The years of austerity prior had taken a toll on the popularity of the governing 
coalition. While an electoral coalition formed between PSD and its coalition partner, CDS-PP, 
gained a plurality of the vote, PS and other left-wing parties like the Left Bloc and the Unitary 
Democratic Coalition, an electoral coalition between the Portuguese Communist Party and the 
Green Party, easily overtook that majority.180 After a brief conflict with the PSD and CDS-PP 
alliance which had briefly formed a minority government, António Costa, the leader of the 
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Socialist Party, formed a coalition government with several hardline leftist parties and became 
the new Prime Minister.181 
After the Crisis/Conclusion 
 By September 2017, Portuguese unemployment had dipped below its previous lows in 
2008.182 Portugal’s ‘go-it-alone’ method after troika intervention did not damage the progress 
already being made by the country prior to Costa’s premiership: the average negative monthly 
change in unemployment from Portuguese unemployment’s peak in 2012 until the end of Passos 
Coelho’s premiership was -0.1 percent; the exact same figure was the average monthly drop in 
unemployment during Costa’s premiership.183 Unfortunately for Passos Coelho, Prime Minister 
Costa’s tactics of maintaining this steady decline in unemployment fared better electorally than 
commitment to austerity; Costa won reelection with a plurality and the Socialist Party chose to 
form a minority government on its own in October 2019. Costa’s reelection distinguishes 
Portugal’s recovery from the recovery in Ireland whose own recent election saw the electoral-
political order of the last several decades rebuked. 
Ireland 
 Quite unlike the stories of dictatorship that had characterized quite a bit of the twentieth 
century for Greece and Portugal, Ireland spent the second half of the twentieth century as an 
independent, democratic state. In 1973, the year before Greece and Portugal had even gained 
their freedom from dictatorship, Ireland became a member of the European Economic 
Community and began its path toward the 21st century adoption of the euro as the country’s 
currency. The beginnings of Ireland’s economic woes in the 21st century can be found in the 
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political response to similar crises in the 1980s. From 1981 to 1982, the country faced three 
general elections primarily focused on economic issues.184 Despite this strong focus on the 
economy, actual conditions only seemed to worsen; even with the debt standing at 130 percent of 
GDP and a substantial tax burden on top of borrowing, unemployment reached 17 percent by 
1986.185 By the time the center-right Fianna Fáil (FF) took power in 1987, it had become clear 
that something needed to change and millions of pounds of spending cuts were implemented 
leading to a sharp decrease in interest rates.186  
By the mid-1990s, it seemed as if FF had restored some of Ireland’s growth potential, 
though it was not clear that measures like spending cuts were decisive in this economic 
restoration; by 1994, non-Irish firms charmed by Ireland’s 10 percent tax rate on corporate 
profits were flocking en masse to the country.187 This influx of foreign capital given the 
advantageous tax policy marked the beginning of what is known as the Celtic Tiger period of 
Ireland economic history during which the Irish economy grew consistently near 10 percent 
annually for the remainder of the 1990s and near 5 percent annually for most of the 2010s.188 
Fianna Fáil under Bertie Ahern won the general election in June 1997 after three years as an 
opposition party to the government.189 Charlie McCreevy, the new finance minister, moved to 
cut not only corporate taxes but also personal income taxes and speculation on real estate, 
leading to an increase in real estate speculation.190 
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Eurozone Accession/Before the Crisis 
 With Ireland’s accession to the euro area in 1999 came a significant drop in borrowing 
costs, leading to a predictable rise in borrowing and a relaxation of Irish banks’ lending 
standards.191 Alongside these developments came a booming building and construction sector; 
between 1999 and 2007, the number of individuals employed in the sector rose from 8.9 percent 
to 13.4 percent of total employment.192 The rise in employment in this sector was accompanied 
by a much broader trend in the labor market with unemployment dropping to just 3.75 percent in 
2000.193  
 Because a great deal of the corporate entities involved in the so-called Celtic Tiger phase 
of economic expansion were American corporations looking for advantageous tax laws, the Irish 
economy experienced many of the same economic shocks through the 2000s as the United States 
did. For instance, both the American economy and the Irish economy stagnated in response to 
the ‘bursting’ of the dot-com bubble and the September 11th attacks.194 In order to maintain the 
relationship of its citizens with American multinationals after such shocks, Ireland tended to 
institute even further tax breaks and advantages to non-Irish corporate entities.195 Meanwhile, 
Irish banks tripled their lending activity from 2002 to 2007 as the real estate sector in Ireland 
continued to boom; a significant portion of this lending went to developers of new housing. 196 
The decreased tax on speculation instituted by Charlie McCreevy only explains part of this 
prioritization as quickly increasing housing prices were threatening to make the benefits of the 
Celtic Tiger inaccessible to most.197 Bertie Ahern, Fianna Fáil’s leader and Ireland’s then-
 
191 Campbell and Hall, 83. 
192 Campbell and Hall, 84. 
193 Lynch, 109.  
194 Lynch, 7. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Lynch, 153; 134-136. 
197 Lynch, 110. 
46 
 
Taoiseach, thus made building more housing a priority as early as 2002.198 Despite these issues 
with housing, Irish macroeconomic figures on the eve of crisis generally painted a positive 
picture. In 2007, Irish unemployment stood at 4.7 percent, long-term interest rates at 4.3 percent 
and government debt at only 28 percent of GDP.199 
 Housing prices finally did fall in February 2007 but the effects of this decreased pricing 
were not those hoped for when Ahern set out the initiative to make housing more affordable.200 
A significant portion of bank lending to housing developers, nearly 80 percent for banks like 
Anglo Irish Bank, were tied directly into land prices which had been consistently rising for 
several years; falling prices made many developers unable to repay loans made by their banks.201 
During the same year, the Irish subsidiary of the United Kingdom-based Northern Rock Bank 
collapsed due to the pricing crisis brewing in Irish real estate and sparking fears that this was the 
beginning of a larger economic crisis.202 
 Leading into the crisis and following the 2007 general election, Fianna Fáil formed a 
coalition government with the Green Party and the Progressive Democrats party, a center-left 
and center-right party respectively, bringing the government’s formal  representation in the Dáil 
to 51.2 percent of the body.203 Bertie Ahern’s leadership of this government was rather brief; the 
Taoiseach resigned in April 2008 following allegations of bribery accepted earlier in his 
career.204 Brian Cowen, Ahern’s deputy, became the Taoiseach and, accordingly, Ireland’s first 
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Taoiseach leading into the country’s financial crisis a month after Ahern announced his 
resignation.205 
The Crisis 
 By September, economic conditions had worsened in the United States and major 
concerns were growing in Ireland over the sustainability of the Irish economy. On September 15, 
2008, the American financial firm Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and, in so doing, 
effectively froze international credit markets; according to Campbell and Hall, the filing also 
triggered substantial concern that Irish banks were on the brink of default.206 Two weeks later, on 
September 29, the government announced that it would guarantee coverage of deposits, senior 
debt and dated subordinated debt for the next two years, estimated to be a more than €330 billion 
commitment.207 By January, the guarantee was not sufficient to maintain confidence in Anglo 
Irish Bank; AIB became the first Irish bank to be nationalized in the midst of the Irish financial 
crisis which would dominate the country’s politics for the next several years.208 Trades of AIB 
on January 16, 2009, shortly after being taken over by the Irish government, were down almost 
99 percent from their same value in 2007.209 
 If 2009 was a year characterized by response to banking crises, 2010 was a year 
characterized by dealing with the debt and deficit crisis created in attempting to solve those 
banking crises. In dealing with recapitalizing the banks, the government had more than doubled 
the national debt in terms of GDP over two years and increased the deficit to 32 percent of 
GDP.210 Meanwhile, the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), the Irish government’s 
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organization established to purchase risky development-related loans from ailing banks, 
purchased far more than expected; the projected growth rate for 2010 was revised downward as a 
result of NAMA’s more intense than expected activity, indicating that the crisis would last much 
longer than the country’s leaders had hoped.211 
 Because of these developing fiscal issues, the government found itself in a rather difficult 
position by late 2010; a banking crisis had developed under which four Irish banks had to have 
been nationalized by this point in time and the amount of spending needed to maintain Ireland’s 
response to the banking crisis instead of a brewing fiscal and unemployment crisis would only 
worsen the perception of the government and its commitment to the economic issues facing 
everyday Irish citizens.212 At the end of 2007, Irish unemployment was measured at 4.9 percent; 
at the end of 2010, unemployment had reached 15.7 percent, perhaps highlighting how much 
strain the real economy was under in light of the banking crisis.213 Despite these conditions, the 
Fianna Fáil government under Brian Cowen was insistent upon austerity even if it would likely 
exacerbate issues like the growing unemployment.  
The government, in an attempt to curb the fiscal imbalances of the country before 
attempting to rescue the labor market, was therefore pursuing a very conservative austerity 
budget which would have reduced the deficit to 3 percent of GDP by the end of 2012, down from 
the previously mentioned 32 percent of GDP.214 These measures and related austerity measures 
were deeply unpopular; by December 2010, just 8 percent of polled Irish voters said that they 
would prefer Brian Cowen to remain as Taoiseach after the upcoming election.215  
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It was not just the case that these measures were unpopular but there was an open 
question about whether domestic measures alone were enough to curb the growing national debt 
and deficit or whether international assistance was needed. Jean-Claude Trichet, then-President 
of the ECB, wrote a letter to Irish finance minister Brian Lenihan in November 2010 suggesting 
that the future provision of emergency funding from the supranational level to failing Irish banks 
would only continue if “the Irish government shall send a request for financial support to the 
eurogroup,” a colloquial term for the euro area’s finance ministers; in sending this letter, Trichet 
seemed to be pressuring Dublin to apply for a bailout agreement with the troika similar to that 
which had been extended to Greece earlier in the year.216 Just a few days later, Dublin formally 
requested such a bailout and a deal was struck for €85 billion of rescue funds in exchange for 
significant structural reforms and spending cuts.217 Labour politician Pat Rabbitte has said that 
the ECB at this time held all of the power in negotiations and that “we had no chance as a small 
country to change that.”218 Admittedly, some of these developments did seem initially to rally 
investor confidence in Ireland; shares of Irish banks on the Eurofirst index rallied in response to 
some of the first austerity measures passed after the bailout agreement had been reached.219 
Additionally, activity in the Irish bond market in response to the bailout was starting to signal the 
easing of some investor concerns; having risen 233 basis points to 9.25 percent in the period 
between October 1st and November 1st, 2010, 10-year Irish government bond yields fell 19 basis 
points between November 1st and December 1st, the period during which the troika’s bailout was 
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announced.220 For the next several months, yields did not drop substantially but the rapid 
increases seen in previous months during the crisis seemed to have mellowed at least 
temporarily.221 
The calming of investors’ fears did not carry over into voter confidence or political 
advantage in Brian Cowen’s leadership. Following an abrupt cabinet reshuffle which only made 
him more unpopular among his government coalition partners and led the Green Party to 
withdraw its support for the government, Cowen resigned as the leader of Fianna Fáil on January 
22, 2011.222 With the election just over one month away, Fianna Fáil was facing an abrupt 
change in leadership and deep unpopularity among the Irish voting population.  
 Meanwhile, Fine Gael (FG), a center-right party serving in 2011 as the largest opposition 
party in the Dáil, was campaigning on a partial easing of austerity. Michael Noonan, a leading 
member of Fine Gael and likely choice for the position of finance minister in a Fine Gael 
government said in the leadup to the election that he would look to negotiate a cut in the interest 
Ireland pays for bailout funds from the troika and would negotiate a reduction in debts owed to 
senior bondholders by Irish banks.223 While ECB officials were quick to reject these ideas during 
the election campaign, Fine Gael continued to campaign on renegotiating the bailout deal and 
their position was increasingly popular among high-profile Irish business representatives as week 
as the public.224 
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The results of the legislative election held on February 25, 2011 uprooted Fianna Fáil’s 
traditional standing in Irish elections. The party suffered its worst performance since its founding 
in the 1920s, ending up in third place behind Fine Gael, Labour and a series of independent 
politicians.225 Meanwhile, Fine Gael and the center-left Labour Party both had record 
performances; the former became the largest party in the Dáil for the first time (though it did not 
win an outright majority) and the latter had its largest representation in the Dáil ever.226 The 
coalition which would eventually form between Fine Gael and Labour gave the government 113 
of the 166 seats in the Dáil, the largest majority (68.1 percent) since the foundation of the Irish 
Free State in 1922.227 Enda Kenny, Fine Gael’s leader and new Taoiseach upon winning a clear 
electoral plurality reiterated that his party’s aim would be to renegotiate the terms of the bailout 
agreement to include lower interest rates on repayment and potentially imposing losses on some 
bondholders.228 
The first few months of the Fine Gael led government were shakier than expected and 
involved significant pushback from European leaders on Kenny’s wish to renegotiate the terms 
of the bailout agreement. In response to Kenny’s push for lower interest rates, Angela Merkel 
remarked that the countries in the euro area “that have homework to do must do it,” suggesting 
that any discussion of lowered interest rates would have to be preceded by the immediate 
implementation of yet more austerity.229 One of Merkel’s strongest points of contention with 
Ireland was the fact that, while it had made progress on increasing tax revenue and cutting 
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spending, it had not raised its extremely low 12.5 percent corporate tax rate at all during the 
crisis.230 French President Nicolas Sarkozy suggested the low corporate tax rate was a form of 
“fiscal dumping” and served as competition against other European states currently contributing 
to the Irish bailout.231 This tension among European leaders alongside new projections that Irish 
debt would reach 125 percent of GDP by 2013 (compared with 25 percent of GDP before the 
crisis began) started to diminish the calm that the bailout had given investors and the Irish 
government 10-year bond yield shot up to a crisis high of 11.7% by June of 2011.232 
Had that conflict held, it is not entirely clear where Ireland would be today. However, the 
deepening economic crisis in Greece eventually did lead to an interest rate cut on bailout funds 
from about 6 percent to between 3.5 and 4 percent.233 By August 2011, while there was still 
certainly caution in the wind, Ireland’s economic outlook was starting to improve: 
unemployment was still rising, though at a much slower pace than it had been;234 the country was 
moving toward a current account surplus due to an uptick in exports and an 11 percent growth in 
overseas visitors over the year ending in August 2011;235 and the government had sold most of 
its stake in the Bank of Ireland in July, one of the first signs from the banking sector that things 
were moving back toward normalcy.236  
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By October 2011, this view from the financial sector and European Union officials had 
only deepened; despite Irish 10-year bond yields reaching 14.07 percent in a brief spike in July, 
the view on October 6, 2011 was a remarkable 637 basis points down from that height at 7.70 
percent making Ireland’s one of the best performing bonds in the world and the best performing 
bond in the euro area over that period.237 Officials from the troika including Istvan Szekely, the 
mission chief for Ireland, praised the country for consistently implementing needed reforms and 
further said that “this is increasingly appreciated by financial markets.”238 The country was 
increasingly being used as an example of a successful bailout implemented by the troika; Nicolas 
Sarkozy referred to Ireland as “almost out of troubled waters, almost out of the crisis.”239 
However, the shifting outlook for Ireland’s economy was not universally felt. At the end 
of 2011, Ireland’s central bank forecast that real personal consumption had fallen 2.6 percent in 
2011 and would fall 0.8 percent more in 2012.240 While the upward trend of unemployment was 
slowing, it was still steep and rising; in January 2012, unemployment reached 16 percent, the 
highest that figure would climb during the 2010s.241  
While Kenny’s government had followed through on seeking lower interest rates on 
troika payments, other electoral promises like imposing losses on some senior bondholders seem 
like they had fallen through the cracks. In October 2011, the Irish government managed a €717m 
repayment to Anglo Irish Bank bondholders at full value despite promising to impose losses and 
without clear pressure from EU leaders to do so; days earlier, EU leaders agreed to a 50 percent 
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haircut on Greek debtholders despite Ireland’s stronger commitment to the imposed austerity 
conditions.242 The spokesman on finance for Sinn Féin, the left-wing Irish republican party, was 
quoted as saying that there was “no legal or moral justification the state to pay back this toxic 
debt.”243 While this and similar bond repayments without losses made in 2012 provoked some 
public anger, mass demonstrations against austerity or policies like these were not common; 
there had only been two mass trade union demonstrations in the four years prior to the beginning 
of 2012.244 
This is not to say that there were no meaningful public reactions against austerity or that a 
lack of public demonstrations could be considered a sign of apathy. According to the Financial 
Times, social commentators had flagged several issues which may have prevented the sprouting 
of mass demonstrations including but not limited to recent memories of hardship, the influence 
of the Catholic Church on education and ideas from the church about activism and, perhaps most 
compellingly, high levels of emigration. In the year ending in April 2012, 46,500 Irish people 
left Ireland to live elsewhere, the highest annual number who had left in a year since the start of 
the economic crisis and up 16 percent from the previous year.245 Additionally, nearly half of Irish 
households at the end of March 2012 paid a €100 household tax which had been instituted under 
a new austerity program and was opposed by several public figures including some Irish 
lawmakers who pledged to go to jail instead of paying the fee.246 Sinn Féin, which had only 
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received 6.9 percent of the vote in the 2007 general election, had also been surging in popularity 
as a left-wing, anti-austerity alternative to the Fine Gael/Labour coalition.247 
Growing public opposition in Ireland to austerity had also provided the backdrop for 
political uncertainty across the euro area as it related to the European Union’s plans for a fiscal 
discipline treaty. At the beginning of 2012, leaders of EU member-states other than the United 
Kingdom and the Czech Republic had agreed to the new Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (‘the Fiscal Compact’) which, among other 
things, mandated strict compliance with a budget balancing rule outside of “exceptional 
circumstances” and required member states to maintain a level of debt below a 60 percent of 
GDP benchmark.248 Ireland announced that, in accordance with its constitutional requirements, it 
would hold a referendum on the treaty in May; while Ireland was not strictly necessary for the 
ratification of the treaty, a rejection of the treaty by the Irish public would have put tremendous 
pressure on European Union leaders to ease some of the treaty’s policies.249 The growing 
popularity of anti-Fiscal Compact voices like the leaders of Sinn Féin led to major uncertainty 
about whether Ireland would pass the Compact, seen by many as a justification for more 
austerity.250 While the Irish public did end up backing the compact in a 60/40 vote, only half of 
all eligible cast a vote and, among those who did, the No vote tended to be very strong in 
working-class regions of the country signaling an increasing class divide on EU matters.251 
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The economic outlook for Ireland continued to be mixed through 2012. Investor 
confidence was coming back rapidly; 10-year Irish bond yields would fall from 7.29 percent on 
January 1st, 2012 to 4.06 percent on January 1st, 2013, the lowest figure since February 2007.252 
In fact, the Irish government was able to make its first issuance of long-term debt since 2010 in 
July 2012 because of how much bond market conditions had improved.253 This may suggest that 
investor confidence in Ireland had essentially recovered by the beginning of 2013. However, 
growth continued to be sluggish; Ireland’s national statistics office released a report in 
September 2012 suggesting that the country’s economy did not grow at all in the second quarter 
of the year.254 Additionally, Ireland’s domestic small and medium-sized businesses faced the 
highest rejection rate for loans in the euro area outside of Greece.255 
The first half of 2013 was similarly mixed. Standard & Poor’s, the American credit rating 
agency, revised Ireland’s outlook from negative to stable in February as Ireland, another signal 
that the global financial sector was quite confident in Ireland’s future.256 However, the Irish 
economy had re-entered recession by the beginning of the second half of the year, net exports 
were falling and Ireland’s rate of emigration was at its highest recorded level since at least the 
1980s.257 Still, Ireland was on track to exit its bailout on December 15, 2013 without a backstop 
or conditions.258 
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After the Bailout/Recovery 
 With unemployment already falling given the easing out of troika-imposed austerity 
conditions, the Irish economy was showing full signs of recovery. It seemed to many as if Ireland 
had become a key argument for proponents of austerity; despite the bad experience of Portugal 
and Greece (and despite Ireland’s own citizens being discontented with authority), recovery was 
in motion under the watch of the largest electoral majority to have ever set foot in Dáil with the 
FG-Labour coalition. Enda Kenny’s electoral luck did not last, though; in 2016 after FG’s surge 
in the 2011 elections with 76 seats, Fine Gael was only able to win 50 of the 158 seats with Fine 
Gael forming a government months after negotiations with Fianna Fáil; part of the deal struck 
with the opposition party was to increase spending and decrease taxes, a first step out of austerity 
and back toward expansionary monetary policy.259  
 Quite impressively, two years after Enda Kenny’s resignation and his succession as Fine 
Gael’s leader by Leo Varadkar, Ireland has reached pre-crisis unemployment numbers below 5 
percent as of September 2019.260 Yet, memories of austerity seem to continue to shift electoral 
politics within Ireland: in the most recent election, no party won more than 38 seats and Sinn 
Féin took the slim plurality in seat number.261 No government has yet been formed given the 
wide dispersal of the vote across the three parties. Still, the upward trend of Sinn Féin does not 
appear to have stopped once austerity stopped; even now, the memory of austerity pervades as 
electoral politics in Ireland become more and more difficult to predict in the aftermath of harsh 
austerity undertaken during the crisis proper. 
 
 
259 Kelly Fiach and Sarah Bardon, “Fine Gael to form government after Fianna Fail deal,” The Irish Times, April 29, 
2016, <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/fine-gael-to-form-government-after-fianna-f%C3%A1il-deal-
1.2629349>. 
260 See Eurostat, “Unemployment.” 
261 Arthur Beesley, “Ireland’s ruling parties in talks to shut out Sinn Fein,” FT, February 25, 2020. 
<https://www.ft.com/content/d1edc18c-57fe-11ea-a528-dd0f971febbc>. 
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Discussion and Application of the Power Model to Each Country262 
Table 2. Leaders of Crisis and Recovery 
Country/Leader 
and Size of 
Coalition 
Date of 
Governance 
Status of 
Unemployment 
Status of 
Investor 
Confidence 
Greece/Papandreou 
(160/300 seats) 
October 2009 – 
November 2011 
Rose from 10.2 
percent to 20.6 
percent 
10Y yield rose 
from 4.57 percent 
to 17.92 percent 
Greece/Papademos* 
(Placeholder – 
Unity Party)  
November 2011 – 
May 2012 
Rose from 20.6 
percent to 24.8 
percent 
10Y yield rose 
from 17.92 
percent to 26.9 
percent 
Greece/Samaras 
(162/300 seats263)* 
June 2012 – 
January 2015 
Rose from 24.8 
percent to 25.8 
percent 
Down after 
spiking but rising 
again during 2015 
election. 
Greece/Tsipras 
(162/300 seats)* 
January 2015 – 
September 2015 
Fell from 25.8 
percent to 24.8 
percent 
Fell from 9.48 
percent to 8.54 
percent 
Greece/Tsipras 
(155/300 seats)* 
September 2015 – 
July 2019 
Fell from 24.8 
percent to 16.3 
percent (not yet 
restored to pre-
crisis levels) 
Fell from 8.54 
percent to 2.16 
percent 
(recovered) 
Portugal/Socrates 
(97/230 seats) 
September 2009-
June 2011 
Rose from 11.3 
percent to 12.4 
percent 
Rose from 3.93 
percent to 10.86 
percent 
Portugal/Passos 
Coelho (132/230 
seats) 
June 2011 – 
October 2015 
No change. On 
way down. 
Fell from 11.3 
percent to 2.1 
percent 
Portugal/Costa 
(122/230 seats) 
October 2015 – 
October 2019 
Fell from 12.4 
percent to 6.7 
percent. 
Restored to pre-
crisis levels. 
Fell from 2.1 
percent to 0.19 
percent. 
Restored to pre-
crisis levels. 
 
262 See Eurostat and OECD for sources of latter two columns in Table 2. 
263 Not including coalition partners for part of governance. 
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Ireland/Ahern and 
Cowen (89/166 
seats) 
May 2007 – May 
March 2011 
Rose from 4.8 
percent to 05.9 
percent. 
Rose from 4.2 
percent to 10.2 
percent. 
Ireland/Kenny 
(118/166 seats)* 
March 2011 – 
May 2016 
Fell from 15.0 
percent to 8.9 
percent 
Fell from 10.2 
percent to 0.76 
percent. 
Restored to pre-
crisis levels. 
Ireland/Kenny and 
Varadkar (57-
59/166 seats) 
May 2016 – 
February 2020 
Fell from 8.9 
percent to under 
5 percent. 
Restored to pre-
crisis levels. 
Stayed low. 
* - ideologically mixed coalition 
 
 The above table (Table 2) represents leaders of the three previously discussed countries 
during periods of crisis and provides information on the movement on unemployment and bond 
yield information from the beginning to the end of their tenure.  One might wonder, as it relates 
to the claim that strong governing coalitions lead toward hastened economic recoveries, why 
Greece’s situation worsens from 2009 to 2011 instead of improving given the presence of a 
parliamentary majority. One quirk of the observation at hand here is that the ideological 
coherence and weight of electoral majorities is influential but not the only factor which must 
occur in order to achieve an economic recovery. For instance, it cannot be overstated how ‘luck’ 
in Barry’s sense of the term worked against Greece during 2010. Papandreou’s leadership was 
hit early with a public debt and deficit crisis stemming from a previous administration and was 
not given the opportunity by outside officials from the European Union to act in a decisive 
manner.  By the end of Papandreou’s tenure as the Greek Prime Minister, Papandreou’s wish to 
call a referendum on the troika bailout programs was rebuffed by European leaders who implied 
the only referendum whose results they would accept would be one regarding Greece’s future 
membership in the euro area. While Papandreou commanded a healthy parliamentary lead, his 
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government did not have the agency necessary to enact policy in Greece that might have been 
more effective in moving the country toward recovery; luck was such that European officials 
forcefully used leverage against Papandreou during the one instance in which the leader wanted 
to challenge the policies imposed on Greece. 
 Similarly, what accounts for the ideological diversity of the coalition that appears to have 
delivered to Ireland an economic recovery while a similarly ideologically diverse coalition in 
Greece failed to deliver such a remarkable result? Several factors seem to be at play here: Fine 
Gael’s partnership with Labour in the Irish case seems based on a strong, shared commitment on 
both sides to austerity policies and the size of the Fine Gael-Labour coalition is immense.  
It is unclear that the Syriza-ANEL coalition is built on such a strong commitment to anti-
austerity positioning as much as a common position in skepticism toward EU structures; not only 
did the coalition ignore the results of a popular referendum held on the continuance of austerity 
programs but the same coalition a year later would approve of many of the same austerity 
policies that were non-negotiable and strongly objectionable to the same coalition during 
Varoufakis’s time as the Greek finance minister.264 It is quite possible that the real point of 
commonality between the self-described radical left wing party and the nationalist-conservative 
party had more to do with taking symbolic positions in order to gain electorally than some strong 
commitment to specific anti-austerity measures and policies. 
It cannot be overstated also how much proportionally more dominant the coalition 
between Fine Gael and Labour is in comparison with Syriza and ANEL. Whereas Tsipras’s 
government is 12 (and later just five) votes from losing potentially controversial measures, the 
Fine Gael-Labour coalition under Enda Kenny has 35 votes of room to maneuver and seek out 
 
264 Sotirios Zartaloudis, “Why Greece’s Syriza Party Is Embracing Austerity Now,” Fortune, June 3, 2016, 
<https://fortune.com/2016/06/03/greece-eurozone/>. 
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strong positions. Whereas the Syriza-ANEL coalition has a majority of 54 percent (and later just 
shy of 52 percent), the Fine Gael-Labour coalition has a majority of 71 percent. Understood this 
way, it is much easier to think about why the parties may have had different approaches to 
possibly decisive but controversial policy plans. 
The case for electoral majorities being quite beneficial is seen within the Portuguese case 
most clearly. Not only is Portugal under a majority party or ideologically consistent bloc of 
parties from 2011 to 2019, the date range of economic recovery in the country, but these parties 
are also ideologically separate. Passos Coelho’s party, the Social Democratic Party, had 
generally more conservative ideals and more strongly committed to austerity during the period of 
the bailout. Costa’s party and his coalition, made up of the Socialist Party and a number of 
smaller left-wing parties, was decidedly anti-austerity and yet the country’s recovery continued 
on the same path in terms of bond market conditions and unemployment. This would suggest that 
more than one kind of policy or ideological position has the opportunity to be decisive or, 
perhaps, that the simple appearance of strong governance can greatly influence domestic 
economic conditions. 
Conclusion 
 This thesis project demonstrates that the asymmetry of economic conditions within 
supranational structures like the euro area of the European Union is greatly influenced by the 
power (i.e. ability to demonstrate decisiveness) governing parties and coalitions wield over the 
domestic political process. Because member states of the euro area have a common monetary 
policy and, in times of crisis, bargain with the same supranational entities, the ability to be 
decisive within one’s own domestic politics becomes very important if countries wish to be able 
to recover relatively quickly as was the case in Ireland and Portugal. For countries like Greece 
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where the ability of a governing party or coalition to be decisive was diminished, lengthy and 
painful economic crises can follow. 
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